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LAW AND ECONOMICS IN LATIN AMERICA. 
SOME ETHICAL ISSUES RECONSIDERED
AdriAn Kuenzler*1
Abstract
In Latin America, law and economics scholarship is gradually 
finding its way into court decisions and legislative enactments, 
both with respect to an increasing tendency to assess the overall 
consequences of  legal rules, in terms of  a growing application of  
cost-benefit analyses, and in the form of  more incentives-driven 
reasoning. Until today, however, the literature on the movement’s 
normative foundations has failed to find common ground on how 
to justify its theoretical suppositions. This article illuminates this 
debate and provides an overview over some of  the approach’s 
most basic assumptions that relate to its positive and normative 
implications.
Keywords: Law and Economics, Rational Choice Theory, Efficiency, Utilitarianism, Wealth 
Maximization, Consensus Theory, Pragmatism
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been almost two generations since Ronald Coase initiated the rise 
of law and economics in the United States. Despite the movement’s resounding 
success both in scholarship and practice, most civil law jurisdictions have remained 
impervious to the adoption of the economic analysis of law as an integral part of 
their methodology–even if a number of significant scholarly contributions originated 
from the civil law world.1 At least in Latin America, however, there is a growing 
tendency to integrate economic reasoning into legal thought, as a number of recent 
Argentinian and Brazilian court decisions and legislative enactments attest.2 This 
rising transformation notwithstanding, deployment of economic reasoning remains 
scarce in most civil law jurisdictions. This is due, in part, to a lack of agreement about 
the movement’s normative foundations. This article illuminates this debate and 
provides an overview over some of the approach’s most fundamental assumptions 
*1  Faculty of  Law, Zürich University, Switzerland, and Yale Law School, United States (adriankuen-
zler@gmail.com). I would like to thank the University of  San Andrés, Buenos Aires, Argentina, for 
giving me an opportunity to present lectures in August 2018 on which parts of  this article are based, 
and to anonymous reviewers for insightful comments. All errors are my own. Article received on 
September 20, 2018 and accepted for publication on December 6, 2018. 
1  Some of  the most important works include AssmAnn, Kirchner and schAnze (1993); schäfer and 
Ott (2005); tOwfigh and Petersen (2017).
2  For an overview of  these developments see irigOyen-testA (2015); PArgendler and sAlAmA (2015).
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that relate to its positive and normative implications. Specifically, this article provides 
a survey of central issues confronting contemporary law and economics scholarship 
and blends the most contentious issues to equip the reader with a comprehensive 
understanding of its underlying suppositions.
The economic analysis of law addresses two principal issues about legal rules–
one that is descriptive, and another that is normative. The descriptive issue relates to 
the effects, i.e., the consequences of legal norms and judicial decisions in reality. For 
example, the economic analysis of law asks how car accident liability rules affect the 
number and severity of car accidents, the compensation of victims of car accidents, 
and the parties’ litigation costs to enforce liability.3 The normative issue evaluates the 
social desirability of legal rules from an economic perspective and makes statements 
about how the law should be designed to achieve a socially desirable result.4 While 
particular areas of law, such as antitrust, business corporations, and the regulation 
of economic activity more generally have long been subject to economic analyses, 
since the 1960s, proponents of the economic analysis of law have expanded their 
scope of research into almost all areas of the law, including, for instance, criminal, 
evidence, and family law.
This expansion is closely connected with research conducted by a number of 
distinguished American economists. In 1960, Ronald Coase demonstrated that the 
allocation of property rights through the legal system will only affect the result of 
private bargaining in a world of high transaction costs.5 Otherwise, private bargaining 
will always lead to a Pareto efficient outcome–irrespective of the manner in which 
the law allocates individual property rights. In 1965, Armen Alchian presented a 
comprehensive economic theory of property rights.6 In 1968, Gary Becker extended 
the domain of the economic analysis of law to a wide range of nonmarket behavior 
such as crime, racial discrimination, family organization, and drug addiction.7 In the 
1970s, Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed published a comprehensive treatment 
of the efficient distribution of risks resulting from harm.8 In 1971 and 1975, William 
Landes and Richard Posner wrote a series of foundational articles on the economic 
analysis of the criminal process and the court system.9 Richard Posner is the author 
of the most significant textbook on the economic analysis of law, which, in 2014, 
appeared in its ninth edition.10
3  cAlAbresi (1970).
4  cAlAbresi (1961).
5  cOAse (1960).
6  AlchiAn (1965).
7  becKer (1968).
8  cAlAbresi and melAmed (1972).
9  lAndes and POsner (1975).
10  POsner (2014).
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Under the economic approach to the analysis of  law, the assessment of  social 
policies and legal rules is undertaken with respect to a stated measure of  social wel-
fare. A particular legal arrangement is deemed to be superior to another if  the first 
arrangement produces a higher level of  the stated measure of  social welfare. From 
this it follows that the social welfare criterion under consideration determines to a 
considerable extent which legal rule may be optimal. If  the desired social goal were 
simply to bring about a decrease in the number of  car accidents caused, the best 
rule might embrace a regime in which causing car accidents is severely punished. 
However, if  the desired social goal also includes the benefits that citizens obtain from 
driving cars, the best rule would have to be designed differently.
The most widely employed measure of social welfare is presumed to be a func-
tion of individual utilities, which, in turn, may be a function of anything about 
which individuals care (e.g., tangible or intangible needs, other-regarding pleasures, 
motives of fairness to be satisfied, etc.).11 For a number of practical reasons, standard 
economic analysis, however, focuses on fairly simple measures of social welfare that 
rarely take into account the distribution of utilities such as the distribution of income 
or the distributive effects of the choice of legal rules. Furthermore, for analytical 
convenience, notions of fairness and morality, such as an insistence that a wrongdoer 
makes restitution to their victim for the harm endured, are ordinarily excluded from 
the analysis.12
The economic analysis of law attaches significant importance to the idea that 
individuals are acting rationally, considering all conceivable and foreseeable conse-
quences of their choices.13 By describing individual behavior, the economic analysis 
of law emphasizes the use of stylized models and of statistical, empirical tests of the-
ory in describing individual behavior. As a result, legal sanctions act as prices that 
make certain types of behaviors more expensive as compared to others. Efficient, in 
economic terms, are consequences that increase social welfare; inefficient are those 
that decrease it.14
Against this backdrop, the economic analysis of law has the potential to reduce 
the complexity of legal rules and increase predictability. Based on positive ratio-
nal choice theory and on the normative criterion of allocative efficiency, legal and 
economic scholars may find common ground on a whole range of issues that are 
relevant to both fields. To the extent that legal rules become more predictable based 
on rational choice assumptions, the rules’ conclusions will be amenable to empirical 
testing and falsification.15 This may render it possible for the law to develop into a 
discipline that exhibits properties of modern scientific inquiry. The economic analy-
sis of law explains the effects of legal rules by assessing their economic efficiency and 
11  shAvell (2004), p. 2.
12  shAvell (2004), pp. 3-4.
13  becKer (1976).
14  becKer (1968).
15  POsner (2014); schwArtz (2015).
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by predicting, based on this criterion, which laws should be promulgated. From this 
follows the premise that legal rules that allocate resources most efficiently enjoy a 
comparative advantage over laws that are based on alternative criteria such as fair-
ness or equity, because efficient legal rules prevail within the market mechanism’s 
process of selection.16
A frequently employed concept of  efficiency by scholars is Pareto efficiency. A 
legal rule is Pareto efficient if  it could not be altered so as to make one person better 
off  without making another person worse off. A somewhat thinner conception of  
efficiency is Kaldor–Hicks efficiency. A legal rule is Kaldor–Hicks efficient if  it were 
made Pareto efficient given that some parties compensated others for their loss. Most 
law and economics scholarship thus operates within a neoclassical welfare economic 
framework that allows policymakers to evaluate which rules increase social welfare. 
All actors within a legal system–not just legislators, but also administrative agencies 
and courts–are required to make decisions that increase social welfare or at least will 
not diminish it.
II. ASSUMPTIONS
Addressing the normative issues on which the economic analysis of law is 
based calls for an examination of its positive assumptions first. The most essential 
assumption that the economic analysis of law makes is grounded on rational choice 
theory. Rational choice theory presumes that individuals always strive to maximize 
their utility (or happiness) but does not specify where individual preferences or wants 
originate; rational choice theory only mandates a consistent ranking of the indi-
vidual’s alternatives. There is thus nothing irrational in one individual preferring 
an apple to an orange and another preferring the opposite; however, it would be 
irrational for one individual to prefer an apple to an orange on one occasion and to 
prefer an orange to an apple on another, without anything else having changed.17 
Based on this assumption, proponents of rational choice theory are able to predict 
the outcomes and patterns of individual choices. While they refrain from describing 
any decision-making process itself, proponents of rational choice theory assume how 
individuals behave under a particular set of conditions. They do not, however, make 
any ethical or normative statement about how individuals ought to act.18
Most often, rational choice theory is grounded on the additional assumption 
that individuals are self-interested so that they behave as if  a comprehensive balance 
of  costs and benefits led them to arrive at an act that maximized personal advan-
16  Priest (1977).
17  sen (1997), p. 55. Even though the concept of  rationality used in rational choice theory is narrower 
than the colloquial understanding of  it, individual behavior is deemed to be rational according to 
proponents of  this theory if  that behavior is geared toward a particular goal, is reflective (evaluative), 
and consistent across numerous choice situations and across time. Irrational, by contrast, is behavior 
that is arbitrary, impulsive, unevaluative (i.e., adopted by imitation), or conditioned.
18  For a critique of  this assumption sen (1997), p. 55.
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tage. Rational choice theorists do not purport to claim that these assumptions are an 
accurate description of  the real world. They make these assumptions simply to help 
formulate clear and falsifiable hypotheses about individual and collective behavior.
A second fundamental assumption of the economic analysis of law is based 
on the criterion of allocative efficiency. This criterion enables analysts to assess if legal 
rules and decisions are, in fact, economically efficient. While the early neoclassical 
approach attempts to measure, by observation or by judgment, an individual’s utility 
that results from a change in social or economic conditions (and thus assumes inter-
personally commensurable utility functions),19 proponents of the new welfare eco-
nomic approach dispense with cardinal measures of utility, replacing efficiency with 
an ordinal utility function that merely asks which option may be “better,” “worse,” 
or “equally preferable” to another.20
2.1. The Economic Model of  Behavior
2.1.1. The Scarcity of  Resources
The economic analysis of law proceeds from the fundamental economic 
problem of having ostensibly infinite human wants in a world of limited resources. 
The idea of scarcity states that there are never enough productive resources to satisfy 
all human wants and desires. For individual agents, this notion of scarcity entails 
making a tradeoff, i.e., sacrificing something to obtain (more of ) the scarce resource 
that is requested. One way to allocate scarce resources is through competition 
between individuals who desire such resources so that market prices coordinate–
based on an individual’s willingness to pay–the allocation of scarce resources.21 The 
condition of scarcity makes the study of human behavior, in particular the choice–or 
the alternative–between scarce resources, the central unit of analysis: as productive 
resources are limited, humans have to choose one option and forgo another. This 
phenomenon is referred to as opportunity cost: presuming the best available choice 
is made, i.e., choosing an apple over an orange, the opportunity cost of selecting 
an apple is the cost incurred by not being able to enjoy the benefit from choosing 
an orange.22 In order to evaluate which alternative provides an individual with 
the highest benefit to themselves, the economic analysis of law employs the law of 
diminishing marginal utility: when an individual consumes more of a specific option 
(e.g., bread), the value of the consumed good (bread) diminishes and the individual 
starts preferring another (e.g., cheese). The fall in marginal utility, as consumption 
of one good increases, therefore determines to a significant extent which alternative 
the individual will choose.23
19  mArshAll (1920), pp. 58-90; PigOu (1932), pp. 42-43.
20  rObbins (1937), pp. 138-139; ArrOw (1951), p. 9; de scitOvsKy (1951), pp. 304-305; little (1957), p. 52.
21  vOn hAyeK (1945).
22  buchAnAn (1991).
23  menger (1950), p. 187; gOssen (1983).
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2.1.2. The Rationality Principle
The condition of  scarcity implies that human behavior must tend to achieve 
a particular benefit–a certain degree of  want satisfaction with the lowest possible 
use of  a scarce resource or with a specific use of  resources. According to economic 
theory, this condition in turn implies that individual action follows the principle of  
utility maximization.
Utility maximization entails that individuals choose from several alterna-
tives the one that maximizes their own benefit. To this extent, individual decision-
makers do not care about the welfare of others; however, even utility-maximizing 
individuals may behave altruistically if altruistic behavior promotes, at least to some 
extent, an individual’s own benefit.24
It further follows from the utility maximization principle that individuals are 
capable of acting to their own advantage, i.e., to estimate and assess their sphere of 
influence so as to maximize their own benefit. At the level of the individual, this 
implies that individuals choose—based on complete and transitive preferences—the 
outcome they prefer most. If an individual has a choice between options X and Y, 
the individual can then state whether X is preferred to Y or whether Y is preferred to 
X or whether both are equally preferred. Each individual is able to rank the elements 
of their choice in an internally consistent manner or to state whether they are indif-
ferent as to the given alternatives. Transitivity occurs if the individual prefers X to Y 
and Y to Z, and, as a consequence, also prefers X to Z.25
A particular decision-making context is thus generally described by two 
distinct conditions that involve preferences and constraints. A preference describes an 
individual’s internal attitude, their evaluative judgment toward a particular set of 
objects. Preferences are generated by decision-making processes, such as conscious 
or subconscious choices, and can be affected by an individual’s surroundings and 
education, social and cultural background, or religious beliefs.26 Constraints refer to 
external stimuli that provide an incentive to induce a particular behavior.27 The 
economic model of individual behavior explains behavioral changes primarily, if not 
exclusively, in response to external stimuli, i.e., in response to changes in constraints. 
Preferences are thought to be stable and provide no explanation for changes in 
individual behavior.28 For example, if a consumer is given a choice between products 
A and B, a constraint may result from the individual’s available income and from the 
prices of the goods that have been offered to them. Further constraints may include 
the amount of time available for consuming the good (e.g., with respect to performing 
a hobby), legal rules (e.g., when consuming illegal drugs), or ethical norms (e.g., with 
24  fehr and schmidt (2003).
25  sen (1997), p. 58.
26  Kuenzler and KysAr (2014).
27  cOOter and ulen (2016), pp. 12-14, 18-20, 20-24.
28  KrePs (1990), p. 25.
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respect to the consumption of products manufactured by children in developing 
countries).29 Generally speaking, the relevant constraints that determine individual 
behavior are relatively easy to define. An individual’s (internal) preferences, however, 
are often rather difficult to gauge. Consequently, economic theory tends to assume 
that individual preferences are more stable than are external constraints, i.e., that 
they are less often subject to change and are more difficult to control.30
In this manner, the economic analysis of  law allows the prediction of  changes 
in individual behavior as a result of  changes in individual constraints. Such predictions are 
potentially falsifiable. The empirical test on which a prediction is based consists in a 
comparison between the predicted and the actual behavior as it is observed in reality.
2.1.3. Methodological Individualism
The economic model of behavior examines the world from the point of view 
of the individual. This view is based on the supposition that there is no objective 
method to measure absolute individual utilities and to compare such utilities inter-
personally (e.g., whether product A affords person A with 100 units of utility and 
person B with 200 units of utility, while product B affords them each only 50 units of 
utility). At the most, individual utility can be measured and compared ordinally, i.e., 
in relation to measures such as “better,” “worse,” or “equally preferable.”31
Following on from this, legal norms are seen as a result of a cooperation 
between individuals who in turn decide on what, how, and when to consume, based 
on their own individual utility functions, and individuals cooperate with other 
individuals solely to their benefit. The economic analysis of law does not recognize 
any collective entity that could not be derived from the utility functions of the 
community’s individuals themselves. Collective decisions always are the outcome of 
an aggregation of individual choices rather than of discrete actions of a collective. 
Put differently, collective utility functions are only recognized if they can be derived 
from individual wants.32
2.2. The Economic Efficiency Rationale
2.2.1 Pareto Efficiency
Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto proposed a simple decision-making criterion 
to evaluate the desirability of different states of resource allocation in a society.33 
Due to its widespread application in economics and other disciplines, the concept 
has come to be known as Pareto efficiency. Pareto efficiency is a state in which society’s 
resources are allocated so that it is no longer possible to make any one individual 
29  hAusmAn (2012), pp. 57-74.
30  But see, e.g., gintis (1974); bOwles (1998).
31  rObbins (1938).
32  stigler and becKer (1977).
33  For an English translation see PAretO (2014).
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better off without making at least one individual worse off. For example, state A is to 
be preferred to state B if at least one individual prefers A to B and no other individual 
prefers B to A. This means that all other individuals also prefer A to B or are indifferent 
as to whether they prefer A or B. Any change to a different resource allocation in a 
particular society that would render at least one individual better off without making 
any other individual worse off constitutes a Pareto improvement. A social state is Pareto 
optimal if it is impossible to make any further Pareto improvements.34 Pareto efficiency 
thus simply requires that individuals value different states of resource allocation in 
terms of “better,” “worse,” or “equally preferable,” not whether they value, say, state 
A as being twice or three times as desirable as state B. Pareto efficiency is in other 
words based on an ordinal measure of utility.
Note that Pareto efficiency does not involve a “ just” society in any strict 
meaning of the term. Even a society in which wealth is created by producing and 
accumulating resources through forced labor can be Pareto efficient, particularly if 
the only improvement of the state of resource allocation of individual workers can be 
achieved by worsening the state of resource allocation of the employers.35
2.2.2. Kaldor–Hicks Efficiency
Pareto efficiency requires that no individual will be made worse off  through a 
change to a different resource allocation. Each member of  a society is given the power 
to veto potentially adverse measures. However, in practice, it is rarely ever possible 
to take any social action, such as a modification in economic policy, without making 
at least one person worse off. Even voluntary exchanges may result in a disadvantage 
to third parties and may, in consequence, fail to be Pareto efficient. The stringency 
of  this concept thus considerably reduces the scope of  government action in real-
world settings. Policies that redistribute income could scarcely be enforced. Taking 
this deficiency into account, the notion of  Pareto efficiency required a modification 
to make it applicable to a wider range of  circumstances.
At the end of the 1930s, English economists Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks 
proposed a concept that captured some of the intuitive appeal of Pareto efficiency 
but that allowed for the satisfaction of less stringent requirements. According to 
Kaldor and Hicks, it ought to be sufficient if those who are made better off could 
hypothetically compensate those that are made worse off and a Pareto efficient im-
provement–a net increase in welfare–would still result.36 Following on from this, a 
situation is said to be Kaldor–Hicks efficient if those who are made better off value their 
gains more highly than the losses suffered by those who are made worse off. A Kal-
dor–Hicks improvement thus simply requires that those who benefit from a particu-
lar change of resource allocation could compensate those that are harmed by it, not 
that compensation is actually paid. If actual compensation were required under the 
criterion of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, this would ultimately amount to achieving a 
34  shAvell (2004), p. 293.
35  sen (1993).
36  hicKs (1939); KAldOr (1939).
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Pareto efficient result. Under the concept of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, by contrast, an 
improvement may actually leave some people worse off. By contrast, Pareto efficiency 
requires that every actor involved is better off or at least that no one actor is harmed.37
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency also dispenses with cardinal utility measures and in-
terpersonal utility comparisons. Assuming, for instance, that a change of  state A to 
state B allows entrepreneur X to build four new factories and to acquire a new ve-
hicle, and, as a result, entrepreneur Y loses an employee, the reallocation from state 
A to state B is said to be Kaldor–Hicks efficient if  Y was indifferent toward state 
A, given that X either transfers the new vehicle to Y or if  Y can build the factories 
instead of  X. Y would be indifferent toward the initial state and would still gain an 
advantage. No cardinal utility measures and interpersonal comparisons of  utility 
are required to determine this result. However, Kaldor–Hicks efficiency ordinarily 
involves a comparison of  the costs and benefits of  a particular change in resource 
allocation in monetary terms. Here, the affected parties no longer need to be asked 
under which circumstances they feel indifferent toward a change. An allocation is 
therefore Kaldor–Hicks efficient if its benefits outweigh its costs. To this extent, Kaldor–
Hicks efficiency merely requires that a change from one state to another results in a 
benefit for society overall, so that those who are harmed could then be compensated.
2.2.3. Kaldor–Hicks Efficiency as an Auction Rule
Richard Posner relied on the concept of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency to articulate 
an auction rule: assigning a legal entitlement such as the right to construct, or to 
refuse to construct, an airport, for instance, to the party who would have purchased 
it absent transaction costs ensures that the entitlement will be secured by the highest 
bidder.38 Such a rule guarantees that the party with the highest willingness to pay 
obtains the entitlement and that this party would be in a position to compensate 
the loser and still benefit from its assignment. Posner’s auction rule does not require 
actual compensation by the highest bidder and does not guarantee that the outcome 
of the entitlement’s allocation is Pareto superior. The rule instead intends to simu-
late an efficient market, which in turn results in a Kaldor-Hicks efficient and Pareto 
optimal state. However, Posner’s auction rule fails to account for the fact that an 
agent’s willingness to pay not only depends on an individual’s utility function, but 
also on their solvency.39 Viewed from this perspective, Kaldor–Hicks efficiency tends 
to penalize the poor while favoring the rich.40
In Posner’s view, assignment of legal entitlements can best be understood as 
attempts to maximize wealth. The concept of wealth maximization states that state 
A is preferred to state B if the wealth of a society is higher in state A than in state B.41 
37  bAumOl (1977).
38  POsner (2014).
39  Further complications with willingness to pay values arise in light of  recent social science work on 
how individuals decide, see Kuenzler (2017a)
40  cOlemAn (2003), pp. 87-94.
41  POsner (1979).
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In its practical application, the wealth maximization principle ordinarily generates 
the same outcomes as the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency criterion. For the latter, it is suf-
ficient if winners can only hypothetically compensate losers. Collective decisions 
should be made so that the total amount of wealth generated through a reallocation 
of resources is maximized for each single individual; a corresponding change in re-
source allocation is Kaldor–Hicks efficient. The economic analysis of law therefore 
is largely based on the concept of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency.
III. EFFICIENCY AS A NORMATIVE PRINCIPLE
The economic analysis of  law represents an important tool to assess the conse-
quences of  legal rules and makes predictions about how individual agents behave in 
response. Its positive orientation and its evaluation of  social policies with reference to 
a stated measure of  economic efficiency affords central importance to the economic 
function and effects of  legal rules.
Against this backdrop, legal scholars and practitioners have asked if wealth 
maximization–or efficiency–is a goal that lawmakers and judges ought to pursue. After 
all, it is far from certain whether a society with more wealth is “better,” or will be 
“better off” than a less wealthy one.42 What is more, law is ordinarily the result of 
numerous social, political, and historical influences. Economic efficiency may be but 
one criterion for assessing the consequences of legal rules, however, it may not be the 
only one. Equity, fairness, rule of law principles, and individual rights are values that 
play a significant part in organizing human societies as well.43 Proponents of the eco-
nomic analysis of law have held, however, that social wealth maximization should be 
the ultimate–or even the only–goal for a society to pursue.44 For what reasons, then, 
should economic efficiency be the main principle underlying a legal system?
An obvious first set of  reasons can be found in utilitarian theory. Utilitarianism is 
an ethical concept that has its roots in the works of  Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill. Particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world, through its further development by Henry 
Sidgwick, it belongs to the most important philosophical movements of  the present day. 
Modern economics, especially welfare economics, was coined by utilitarian thinking. 
And because welfare economic theory has emerged from utilitarianism, utilitarianism 
plays an important part in the debate on the normative foundations of  the economic 
analysis of  law. However, utilitarianism is not the only philosophical position on which 
scholars have tried to base their justifications of  economic efficiency. Utilitarianism 
has been subject to considerable philosophical and ethical objections. An alternative 
attempt to justify the economic efficiency rationale is grounded on John Rawls’ Theory 
of  Justice. Finally, in more recent times, attempts have been made to rationalize the 
economic efficiency goal on pragmatic considerations.
42  dwOrKin (1980a).
43  cAlAbresi (1991).
44  POsner (1980).
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3.1. Utilitarian Justification for Maximizing Economic Efficiency
In his book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham 
set forth the idea that the moral correctness of actions depends on the positive or 
negative qualities of their consequences.45 From the point of view of utilitarianism, 
the correctness of an action is assessed based on its outcomes. In deontological ethics, 
by contrast, it is not the consequences of actions that make them right or wrong but 
actions may be “good in and of themselves,” i.e., without qualification, particularly, 
without regard to their consequences. According to utilitarianism, actions cannot, 
however, be “intrinsically” good without regard to their outcomes. Utilitarianism 
always depends on one or another doctrine of value. Put differently, utilitarianism 
presupposes a value system based on which it is possible to assess whether a particular 
consequence is “good” or “bad.”46
Classical utilitarianism holds that the common goal of individual action con-
sists of increasing the happiness of as many people as possible.47 In its primary and 
broadly accepted sense, the common good implicates the sum of each individual’s 
interests in a particular society. If the common good is comprised of the sum of each 
individual’s happiness, a simple decision-making criterion ensues based on which it 
becomes possible to determine which of two states that favor or discriminate against 
different individuals is to be preferred. For instance, when evaluating if it makes 
sense to move from a particular state A to B, one simply needs to subtract from 
the favored individual’s benefit the discriminated-against’s harm. If the difference 
is greater than zero, the change is justified. Any action that increases the common 
good in this way is warranted from the point of view of utilitarian theory.
Looking at the structural features of  utilitarianism allows us to glimpse a num-
ber of  similarities that this doctrine shares with the economic analysis of  law. Both 
theories evaluate the desirability of  legal rules based on their outcomes (utility maxi-
mization or economic efficiency, respectively). The issue of  whether a particular goal 
in fact is achieved simply depends on the outcome that legal rules will have in the 
future. What is more, both the economic analysis of  law and utilitarianism proceed 
from commonly shared assumptions: both theories result from the motivations and 
actions of  individual agents. There is no collective entity, or goal, independent of  the 
preferences of  individual agents. In assessing the consequences of  legal rules both 
theories are universalist, i.e., they consider the preferences of  all affected individuals 
in the aggregate.
Classical utilitarianism, so-called act utilitarianism, is focused on helping in-
dividuals to choose the right action. Act utilitarianism asks what the consequences 
of a particular act are in any given situation. To rescue the theory from a number of 
its more trenchant criticisms, act utilitarianism came to be modified so as to afford 
a central role to rules. The essential difference between act and rule utilitarianism is 
45  benthAm (1962).
46  PArfit (1986); nAgel (1989).
47  benthAm (1962).
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that while act utilitarianism holds that an action is right if it maximizes utility, rule 
utilitarianism states that an action is right if it conforms to a general rule that maxi-
mizes utility. Under rule utilitarianism, it is not a particular act but a particular rule 
that is evaluated by its consequences. The question is thus what would follow from a 
single action if everyone did the same. Put differently, rule utilitarianism is based on 
the principle of generalization. An act from which bad consequences follow or the 
general performance of which results in bad consequences should not be performed. 
In that manner, rule utilitarianism corresponds with our intuitive judgment that 
moral behavior should be assessed in conformity with common rules. We employ 
this intuition in our everyday moral considerations and deliberations. Time and 
time again we hear statements such as: “What is supposed to happen if everyone 
acted in this manner,” or “think about the consequences if everyone behaved in 
this way.”48 Equally, the economic analysis of law assesses legal rules on the basis of 
a general criterion. It asks whether legal rules–or judge-made decisions–are in line 
with general principles.49
3.1.1. The Wealth Maximization Principle
The utilitarian cost-benefit calculus differs markedly from the Kaldor–Hicks effi-
ciency criterion on which the economic analysis of  law is based. While economic efficiency 
is at the heart of  the economic analysis of  law, utilitarianism compares the utilities of  
individual agents. Admittedly, both utilitarianism and the economic analysis of  law aim 
at increasing a particular social function. Both, however, assume a distinct standard of  
what ought to be right, what should be wrong or what is considered obligatory.
The most important difference between the economic efficiency calculus and 
the utility principle is that the former evaluates social change solely in monetary 
terms. In his essay “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory,” Posner defends 
this conception as a moral counterpart to utilitarianism.50 In so doing, Posner attempts 
to provide a sound philosophical basis for the economic efficiency rationale. But how 
convincing is the corresponding philosophical position itself? In approaching this 
issue, the focus of attention must be on whether the goals of maximizing economic 
efficiency and individual utility are strictly identical.
3.1.2. Differences between the Utility Principle and Economic Efficiency
A first difference between the promotion of  economic efficiency and 
maximizing individual utility is that monetary units are not necessarily identical 
to individual utilities. This becomes most evident when considering the law of  
diminishing marginal utility. In its most general form, the law of  diminishing 
marginal utility states that when an individual increases consumption of  a 
particular good or service, while holding consumption of  other goods and services 
constant, there is a decline in the additional satisfaction some individuals gain 
48  For an overview see scAnlOn (2003), pp. 26-41.
49  POsner (2014).
50  POsner (1979).
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from consuming one more unit of  that good or service. Hence, the utility of  any 
additional unit of  income is smaller than the unit of  income a person has already 
gained. Assuming for reasons of  clarity that all people possess the same utility 
function, it is clear that the effects of  an efficiency-oriented legal policy on the 
overall level of  utility in society depend on the extent to which changes occur and 
with whom they occur. If  someone loses their entire monthly income of  $3,000, 
the person’s loss in individual welfare is greater than if  the same person’s income 
decreases from $10,000 to $7,000. Put another way, according to the Kaldor–Hicks 
efficiency criterion, a change in resource allocation to the extent that 1,000 people 
gain $200 and one person suffers a damage of  $50,000 is efficient since the same 
person could be compensated by the 1,000 people. Measured in individual utilities, 
the loss in individual welfare of  the affected person may, however, be higher than 
the individual utilities the 1,000 people gain. The marginal utility of  a given change 
of  $200 may be minimal if  any of  the winners are comparatively wealthy. On the 
other hand, the loss in utility resulting from a $50,000 damage may, by contrast, be 
high if  the harmed person is very poor.
Introducing weighting factors into any such calculation could alleviate the 
problem of discounting the law of diminishing marginal utility. Depending on 
whether losses and gains are incurred by high- or low-income recipients, such 
losses and gains could be weighted differently, by, for instance, devising income 
districts where changes in low-income districts are multiplied by a high factor 
and changes in high-income districts are multiplied by a low one. Posner appears 
to assume the introduction of such a weighting system when postulating that, in 
principle, wealth maximization is not pecuniary in nature even though money is 
used as a unit of measure.51
But even the introduction of weighting factors cannot eliminate the difference 
between economic efficiency and utility: welfare economics is concerned with utility 
only insofar as utility can be measured in monetary terms. Utilitarianism, however, 
assumes that the pleasure derived from being wealthy is only one among a few. Utility 
is a complex phenomenon exhibiting numerous facets and features. Its complexity 
is most evident in the work of John Stuart Mill.52 Mill’s critics disapproved of 
utilitarianism because the multiplication of hedonic pleasures took center stage in 
formulating its underlying theory and failed to provide an evaluative basis for the 
distinction between ordinary and higher-order pleasures.53 However, both Bentham 
and Mill presumed that the pleasures of the intellect, of our feelings and imagination, 
and of “moral sentiments” on the whole are more valuable than others.54 By so doing, 
the notion of utility in Bentham’s and Mill’s doctrines employs higher faculties and 
puts an emphasis on issues such as education as well.
51  POsner (1979), p. 120; POsner (1995), pp. 99-101.
52  mill (1860); mill (1863).
53  See mAcKie (1977).
54  benthAm (1962); mill (1863).
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3.1.3. Consequences for the Economic Analysis of  Law
On close examination, it seems difficult to justify the economic efficiency goal 
based on rule utilitarianism. From the point of  view of  utilitarianism, legal rules 
that simply aim at increasing wealth in a society are incomplete. Plain utilitarianism, 
however, merely states that individual acts should be evaluated based on their conse-
quences. To evaluate these consequences, a theory is required on the basis of  which 
something is of  “value” so that it can be referred to as being “good” or “bad.” Only 
on the basis of  such a theory can the usefulness of  an act be determined. The theory 
chosen is ultimately irrelevant. Utilitarianism refrains from prescribing a criterion 
that allows for a rational selection among competing value systems. 
Focusing on the theoretical structure of  utilitarianism therefore renders the con-
trast between efficiency and utility less explicit. After all, the usefulness of  a legal 
system that aims at maximizing economic efficiency is determined to a considerable 
extent by the attractiveness of  utilitarianism as a philosophical position–irrespective 
of  the value theory ultimately chosen.
3.2. Evaluating Utilitarianism
3.2.1. The Problem of  Quantification and of  Interpersonal  
Comparisons of  Utility
Utilitarianism assumes that a cost-benefit calculus exists based on which one 
can measure and compare individual utilities. However, interpersonal comparisons 
of  utility pose a problem insofar as there is no external measure for (and thus no 
comparability of) individual utility: how can an individual’s satisfaction gained from 
a particular act be assigned to some units of  utilities and how, as a result, can a re-
lationship between the utilities of  different options that distinct individuals face be 
made–adding or subtracting the utilities of  the consequences suffered by those indi-
viduals? In whatever way “utility” is defined–as intensity or magnitude of  individual 
preferences, as expected or actual gratification, as happiness or satisfaction–the issues 
that arise as a result of  the problem of  interpersonal comparisons of  utility remain.
At first sight, this issue hardly seems relevant for the economic analysis of  law since 
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency requires that different options be ranked solely in terms of  
“better,” “worse,” or “equally preferable.” Here, there is no problem of  quantification, 
and interpersonal comparisons of  utility are rendered obsolete. In practice, however, the 
benefits and costs that result from a particular action are measured in monetary terms. 
In turn, Kaldor–Hicks efficiency is applied just as an ordinary cost-benefit analysis 
would be. Consequently, cardinal measures and interpersonal comparisons of  utility 
are inevitable, at least if  one concludes that a positive monetary result from a change 
in legal rules entails an increase in utility overall. How should one otherwise know 
for certain that a loss of  $1,000 resulting in a decrease in utility for A compensates 
the increase in utility that person B experiences from gaining $1,200? On close 
examination, as this example illustrates, a utilitarian justification of  an efficient legal 
system cannot dispense with such a calculation. The introduction of  Kaldor–Hicks 
efficiency therefore fails to solve the problem of  interpersonal comparisons of  utility.
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3.2.2. The Problem of  Distribution
Utilitarianism further fails to be concerned about the distributional conse-
quences of legal rules. As long as the sum total of happiness or the sum total of 
wealth in a society remains constant, utilitarianism is indifferent toward any other 
distribution of happiness or wealth. A lower level of happiness, or less wealth, of 
person A may be compensated by a higher level of happiness, or more wealth, of 
person B.55
This holds true for a strict efficiency-oriented view as well. It might thus even 
be justified in a society geared toward maximizing economic efficiency to hold some 
people as slaves when at the same time efficiency would increase aggregate social 
welfare. However, proponents of utilitarianism might object that free people work 
more efficiently than people who are being held as slaves. Slaves could buy freedom 
on credit and pay off their debts from the surplus they generate through their labor. 
Slavery, even on a utilitarian view, should thus be abolished.56
3.2.3. The Problem of  Aggregation
An additional point of criticism concerns the tension between individual 
preferences and the utility principle. This tension arises from the principle of 
preference autonomy and the concept of aggregating utility on which utilitarian 
ethics is based. According to the former, utilitarianism allows each individual to 
develop and follow their own wants. From the point of view of the state, however, 
individual acts are assessed solely with respect to the manner in which they affect the 
sum total of all individual utilities. Here, the individual solely counts as part of the 
whole. The focus is not on individual preferences or utilities but on a sum total that 
comprises the addition of happiness or pleasures across persons. Strictly speaking, 
from a utilitarian point of view, individual preferences are only a means to an end; 
they are instrumental in character to the extent that they serve the realization of a 
collective goal–the maximization of overall social utility.57 Such an understanding of 
individual preferences also fails to pay due regard to the function and significance of 
individual rights, which becomes particularly important under circumstances where 
a majority oppresses a minority or individual actors. It is thus contentious whether a 
theory with such far-reaching consequences may legitimately resort to a philosophical 
position in which the basis of individual rights is doubtful. Even classical proponents 
of utilitarian thought were concerned about the state of inalienable individual rights. 
Mill, for instance, in his book On Liberty, vehemently defended the idea of individual 
freedom of action.58 Later on, the objection that utilitarianism fails to take seriously 
individual rights came to prominence with John Rawls’ Theory of Justice.59
55  dwOrKin (1980b).
56  benthAm (1962).
57  POsner (2014).
58  mill (1860).
59  rAwls (1999).
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3.3. Consensus Theory and the Justification of  Economic Efficiency
Due to the above discussed, weaknesses of  utilitarianism, attempts have been 
made to justify the goal of  maximizing economic efficiency based on consensus 
theory, an entirely different philosophical tradition of  conceptualizing utility and 
social welfare. Social contract theory–the vantage point that individuals’ moral and 
political obligations are contingent upon an agreement among them to organize 
the society they inhabit–is given its first comprehensive justification by Thomas 
Hobbes and subsequently by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and John 
Rawls, among others, and ensuing attempts to rationalize social arrangements, or 
“principles of  justice”, on contractual grounds.
Consensus theory found its way into classical welfare economic thinking 
through the work of Pareto. As stated above, Pareto efficiency holds that a particu-
lar resource allocation is superior if at least one person in a society is made better 
off without making any other person worse off. Pareto efficiency uses something 
quite like a social contract argument to explain different social states. In particular, 
Pareto superiority entails that individuals are unable to pursue their own goals with-
out respecting the individual rights of others because everyone who is affected by a 
particular change is required to consent to it. Every individual is recognized as an 
agent with its own rights and responsibilities, rather than as an instrument through 
which the welfare of others is maximized.60 On this widely shared moral foundation, 
scholars, particularly Posner, have attempted to justify even Kaldor–Hicks efficien-
cy on contractual grounds.61 Should such a justification be sound, this would greatly 
increase the appeal of the economic analysis of law. By contrast, a legal system that 
can only be rationalized with reference to Pareto efficiency is subject to the same 
criticism of hypothetical assumptions and static conditions as Pareto’s theory itself.
Hence, the issue arises under what conditions individual actors would agree to 
suffer adverse consequences if  the winners, based on Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, were 
able to compensate the losers, but had to do so only hypothetically? Consensus theory 
requires that economic efficiency actually makes everyone better off. Only under 
these conditions will all individuals involved agree on a particular legal arrangement. 
To answer the question raised above, two distinct strategies have been discussed. 
Both strategies differ with respect to the kind of  knowledge the parties in the original 
position possess. Under Posner’s approach, the parties in the original position are 
thought to act under conditions of  natural ignorance. In Rawls’ model, which was 
presented in a modified version by John Harsanyi, the parties are assumed to act 
under conditions of  artificial ignorance.
60  dwOrKin (1980b).
61  POsner (1983), pp. 88-117.
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3.3.1. Natural Ignorance in the Original Position
Posner’s approach—which is built on Rawls’ model—is concerned with actual 
people that have to consent, in a fictitious original position, to a legal system brought 
in line with the Kaldor–Hicks efficiency criterion. In this position, the choosers 
know their identity, i.e., their talents, their character, their social position, and their 
attitudes toward risks. They plan their lives as far as possible but they cannot foresee 
the future. They find themselves in a state of “natural” ignorance to the extent that 
no one knows whether they will actually be fortunate or whether they will be one of 
the few habitual passersby whose welfare would be increased by, for instance, a strict 
liability standard rather than by negligence rules for car accidents. In this position, 
they have to vote on a legal system based on Kaldor–Hicks efficiency.62
Whenever legal rules are based on Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, a legal regime is 
thought to become more efficient overall; corresponding efficiency gains may consist 
of an increase in total economic welfare. For the sake of illustration, assume a simple 
scenario from antitrust law.63 A refusal to deal by a market dominant company may, 
on this view, result in efficiency gains, particularly if the dominant company is able 
to lower distribution costs below the dealer’s average production costs. If such effi-
ciency gains consist of an increase in overall economic welfare, exclusionary effects 
by the market dominant company on competitors and dealers must be irrelevant 
from the point of view of Kaldor–Hicks efficiency.64
If decision-makers in the original position have to agree on the adoption of such 
a rule, arguably this rule would not unanimously be consented to by all choosers: 
there will be quite a few individuals who will lose out under a Kaldor–Hicks efficient 
legal regime.65
Apologists of a consensus-based theoretical justification of Kaldor–Hicks effi-
ciency might be inclined to disagree. It might well be the case that a few members of 
society will lose ex post, as a result of applying Kaldor–Hicks efficiency to a particu-
lar legal rule. However, these same individuals will presumably benefit as a result of 
the application of another rule so that losses and gains will be compensated. What 
is more, even losers will benefit at a particular point in time (if only indirectly) as a 
result of the application of such a rule: an increase in overall economic welfare will 
ultimately make everyone better off. Under a Kaldor–Hicks efficient legal system, ex 
ante, therefore everyone in the original position can expect that they will ultimately 
benefit. Potential harms will eventually be offset with benefits that result from a 
change in legal rules.66
62  POsner (1983), pp. 100-101.
63  For the standard account see williAmsOn (1968).
64  See, e.g., bOrK (1978), p. 307.
65  See Kuenzler (2017b).
66  POsner (1983), pp. 94-95.
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What do these arguments imply? It should be noted, first, that the idea that 
in the long run losses are always compensated by benefits tends to reduce the eco-
nomic efficiency calculus to measuring economic welfare in purely monetary terms 
and thereby screens out factors that can scarcely be captured in this fashion. Most 
contemporary legal systems for instance acknowledge the ability of an individual to 
choose to be an entrepreneur rather than to be an employee without their options 
being restrained by unnecessary barriers to entry or exclusionary practices, i.e., the 
idea that individual economic activity is not simply a means to an end but also is an 
end in itself.67 Taking this observation into account, the maximization of economic 
efficiency cannot always render everyone better off. It raises the issue of how long 
it may take for the losers of such a regime to be compensated so that they benefit.68
Beyond these methodological issues, the concept of “ex ante compensation” 
also gives rise to more substantive ethical questions. For instance, a number of people, 
or groups of people, might from the outset benefit more significantly than others. 
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency, however, takes a particular income and asset allocation 
as given. Furthermore, applying Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to substantive legal rules 
requires lawmakers to evaluate goods that ordinarily are not bought and sold on 
free markets and for which market prices frequently fail to exist. However, Posner’s 
asset allocation rule presumes that legal entitlements ought to be sold to the highest 
bidder. Here, high-income individuals or particularly wealthy citizens will benefit 
more than others. Simultaneously, and for the same reason, there are numerous 
people or groups of people who, at present, benefit significantly from “inefficient” 
legal rules. In an “efficient” society, these people will lose considerably as compared 
to the status quo, and will have little incentive to consent to a Kaldor–Hicks efficient 
system. Apologists thus concede that the idea of “ex ante compensation” fails to 
make everyone better off; instead, the concept of “ex ante compensation” solely 
states that in the long run everyone will benefit.69
But even if all members of a society can expect to gain in the future, no one indi-
vidual can be certain that ex post they will actually be better off. Although everyone 
in the original position may have positive expectations, there will always be a few 
unfortunate ones. The probability of each participant of being a winner is just an 
expectancy and may, ex post, turn out to be hypothetical. If people in the original 
position exhibit different risk attitudes, those who are mostly risk averse arguably 
will oppose a society geared toward Kaldor–Hicks efficiency.70
As a result, there will always be at least a few individuals opposing an efficiency-
oriented legal system under conditions of natural ignorance. Ronald Dworkin criti-
cized the attempt to justify Kaldor–Hicks efficiency based on consensus-theoretical 
grounds as follows: if the concept of “ex ante compensation” includes the notion that 
67  See thOrelli (1955); blAKe and JOnes (1965); Kuenzler (2017c), pp. 222-249.
68  Keynes (1924), p. 80.
69  POsner (1983), pp. 94-95.
70  POlinsKy (1974).
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consent of those losing out can be “bought,” or be “traded in,” then such a system is 
grounded not on an actual but on a fictitious consent of the people who are involved in 
making a decision. A social contract that is based on the consent of many, but not of 
all, is no social contract. Doing away with the requirement of unanimity–a require-
ment on which all consensus-theoretical models are based–means doing away with 
a justification based on consensus-theoretical grounds itself. The argument that the 
losses of those who are harmed may be offset by the benefits of those who will win 
is, strictly speaking, a utilitarian one. It does not matter, according to utilitarianism, 
if only a few consent to such a policy because individuals themselves do not count. 
Yet consensus theory is based on the view that each individual has their own vote 
in determining the role and fate of their society precisely because it matters if only a 
few or everyone agrees.71
3.3.2. Artificial Ignorance in the Original Position
Unlike Posner, Rawls and Harsanyi assumed that people have to decide under 
conditions in which they do not know their own identity. The approach taken by 
Rawls presumes that people decide behind a “veil of ignorance” where they know 
nothing about their talents, tastes, or abilities, their social class or their status, or even 
their notion of what is “good” or “bad.”72 In Harsanyi’s model, the idea that political 
choices have to be taken under a veil of ignorance is operationalized on the idea that 
each single individual holds the same probability to take up a particular position.73 
While both approaches exhibit similar features, Rawls and Harsanyi arrive at different 
conclusions. According to Rawls, in the original position, artificial ignorance results 
in a system of comprehensive and equal liberties for all and necessitates the principle 
that social and economic inequalities are only tolerable if they afford the highest 
possible benefit to the worst-off. Rawls contends that in an original position of equal 
participants, people will fail to agree on utilitarian conventions because utilitarianism 
fails to rule out that the welfare of only a few is diminished with a view to increasing 
the welfare of many.74 Since no one knows their social position, no one will agree on 
a criterion under which the possibility exists that they will have to spend their lives 
as slaves. Participants would, however, agree on the idea that everyone should be 
afforded the same maximum amount of liberty. This view stands in stark contrast 
with the approach taken by Harsanyi under which the parties in the original position 
would choose to agree on a society based on utilitarian principles.75
According to Harsanyi, participants under a veil of artificial ignorance would 
consent to the utility maximization principle because self-interested individuals will 
always choose the institutional structure that maximizes the expected utility of a par-
ticular state X. The expected utility that results from such a state is the sum of 
71  dwOrKin (1980b).
72  rAwls (1999), pp. 102-168.
73  hArsAnyi (1955).
74  rAwls (1999), pp. 266-267.
75  hArsAnyi (1955), p. 314.
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individual utilities multiplied by the probability according to which an individual 
will take up the respective position. Assuming that for each individual there is the 
same probability to take up a particular position, in a society with three parties, 
an individual’s probability to take up a particular position amounts to 1/3. If all 
participants make the same calculation–each participant has to put themselves in 
everyone else’s shoes and determine the utility they experience in the respective 
position–all individuals will identify an identical sum of total utilities among a par-
ticular population.76
For example, if  the cardinal utility of  social arrangement X is 3 for participant 
A, 5 for participant B, and 10 for participant C, the sum total of  all utilities in society 
X is 18. The total sum of  expected utility for society X then is 6 since the probability 
of  being one of  the above participants in a society with three members is 1/3. Com-
paring state X with state Y in which the cardinal utility for A amounts to 6, for B to 2, 
und for C to 13–and hence, the sum total of  all utilities in society Y for all individuals 
is 21–the expected utility for state Y is 7 in a society with only three members. Under 
Harsanyi’s approach, state Y is therefore preferable to state X.
One issue with Harsanyi’s approach is that it is highly unlikely that each individual 
will have the same probability of taking up any one position in a society. Harsanyi’s 
theory implies that the relevant uncertainties of alternative states are equally probable. 
Moreover, Harsanyi’s approach presupposes cardinal utility analysis and interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. Each participant is supposed to be able to articulate for themselves 
how much utility which state will produce, and each participant is supposed to be able 
to put themselves in the position of another individual and to determine their cardinal 
utility as well. Each participant is supposed to do so and everyone is supposed to arrive 
at the same conclusion. Only under these conditions can a consensus be reached as to 
which state actually maximizes expected utility.77
An additional objection to Harsanyi’s approach concerns the level of risk aver-
sion of the parties involved in the original position. Given that in the original position 
participants remain uninformed about their own risk attitudes, each participant is 
presumed to have risk neutral preferences. Under these conditions, it may be plausible–
assuming conditions of artificial ignorance–that participants agree on an institu-
tional structure that maximizes the expected utility of a particular state X. If the 
parties are risk averse, however, a different outcome ensues. Here, the distribution 
of wealth determines the outcome: if in a particular state X wealth is distributed 
unequally between A and B but is generally very high and in state Y wealth is dis-
tributed evenly between A and B but is generally low, risk-averse parties will tend 
to prefer Y over X: both A and B need to expect that they will belong to the disad-
76  hArsAnyi (1955), p. 314.
77  Rawls explicitly comments on this issue. According to Rawls, statements about probabilities are only 
possible if  there are objective indications of  how often certain states will or will not occur, rAwls 
(1999), pp. 144-146.
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vantaged; however, both A and B would have a higher expected utility in state X.78 
This criticism applies to the economic analysis of law as well because Kaldor–Hicks 
efficiency cannot ensure that everyone will actually be better off.
At this point, a major difference between Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ approaches 
becomes apparent. Rawls’ theory is based on the presumption that participants 
in the original position are highly risk averse.79 Based on this presumption Rawls 
arrives at an outcome that differs markedly from Harsanyi’s approach. Harsanyi 
simply observes that decision-making under conditions of artificial ignorance is a 
“fair game” and that it could thus be assumed that participants would be more risk-
seeking than in real life.80 Apart from this observation, Harsanyi fails to justify why 
participants in the original position are more risk-seeking than Rawls presupposes. 
Since the parties’ risk attitudes are a determining factor in how a society will be 
arranged, without further ado, Harsanyi’s simple assumption about the level of risk 
that individuals are willing to incur can scarcely be entirely convincing.
On top of  that, in Harsanyi’s theory, an important difference with respect to 
the relationship between utilitarianism and economic efficiency persists. As intimated 
above, there is no identity between the utility principle and economic efficiency. Hence, 
even if  we assume that the parties in the original position are risk neutral and agree 
on the utility principle, it is far from clear whether they will also agree on Kaldor–
Hicks efficient legal rules. The utilitarian goal on which the parties agree under such 
conditions cannot simply be equated with the objective of  promoting material wealth 
in a society. The maximization of  economic efficiency will presumably come at the 
expense of  maximizing other utilitarian objectives. There are numerous ways in which 
a utilitarian society may be arranged. The maximization of  economic efficiency 
might be one goal to pursue in such a society but it is unlikely to be the sole one.
3.4. Pragmatic Justification of  Economic Efficiency
In light of  the difficulties just discussed, proponents of  the wealth maximiza-
tion principle, particularly Posner, began to shift their attention toward justifying the 
economic efficiency rationale on purely pragmatic grounds. The most powerful argu-
ment for the wealth maximization principle, according to this view, is not of  a moral 
but of  a practical nature. People who live in societies in which markets operate freely 
are not only wealthier than people living in other societies, Posner argues, but also 
78  rAwls (1999), pp. 143-144.
79  rAwls (1999), pp. 153-154: “They cannot enter into an agreement that may have consequences 
they cannot accept. They will avoid those that they can adhere to only with great difficulty. Since the 
original agreement is final and made in perpetuity, there is no second chance. In view of  the serious 
nature of  the possible consequences, the question of  the burden of  commitment is especially acute. 
A person is choosing once and for all the standards that are to govern his life prospects. Moreover, 
when we enter an agreement we must be able to honour it even should the worst possibilities prove 
to be the case. Otherwise we have not acted in good faith. Thus the parties must weigh with care 
whether they will be able to stick by their commitment in all circumstances.”
80  hArsAnyi (1953), p. 435.
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have more political rights, more freedom and dignity, and are generally more satisfied 
with themselves. Wealth maximization, in this account, is the most important basis 
on which to achieve happiness as a social goal.
This argument forms part of the philosophical tradition of pragmatism, which 
has defined American legal philosophy to date. Pragmatism had a strong influence 
on Oliver Wendell Holmes and subsequent American legal realists. The American 
legal realist movement is difficult to characterize, however, as it failed to accommo-
date a unified doctrine and failed to form a coherent legal theory itself.81 Hermann 
Kantorowicz summarized the movement’s claims–which are by no means uncon-
troversial within the realist camp–succinctly as follows: “The Law is not a body of 
rules, not an Ought, but a factual reality. It is the real behavior of certain people, 
especially of the officials of the Law, more especially of the judges who make the Law 
through their decisions, which, therefore, constitutes the Law.”82
Posner’s philosophical position, however, does not identify law with actual be-
havior but with suppositions that describe actual behavior. This view dates back to 
the so-called prediction-theory of law devised by Holmes. In order to understand 
what law really is, according to Holmes, we have to take the position of the bad 
man. The bad man is not interested in legal principles but is interested in how courts 
will decide. Law is therefore nothing more ambitious than a set of speculations as 
to what courts will actually do.83 Understood in this manner, legal rules are “rules 
of description and prediction.” They can be tested with respect to their informative 
value by comparing them with subsequent judgments and by determining how they 
conform or deviate from a particular rule. If there is a high degree of consistency 
between them, they are considered “real rules,” i.e., rules that embody actual law, 
as they are literally observed by the courts. If there is a low degree of consistency, 
they are merely “paper rules,” i.e., rules that are not observed by the courts and are 
thus only real on paper. The most urgent task of the law, according to legal realists, 
is the examination of real rules. By contrast, conventional doctrinal questions should 
receive less attention.
The pragmatic character of Posner’s argument rests on the fact that it refrains 
from justifying wealth maximization as a desirable principle. Legal theory should 
be less concerned with semantic and metaphysical issues and more with factual–em-
pirical–ones, i.e., it ought to become more pragmatic. Posner refrains from assigning 
wealth maximization an intrinsic value or from defending wealth as something in-
trinsically good. Rather, wealth has a value because it enables people to achieve other 
goals. Herein resides Posner’s assumption when he observes that countries in which 
markets operate more or less freely have a high standard of living.84
81  menAnd (2001); for an excellent overview see reA-frAuchiger (2005).
82  KAntOrOwicz (1934), p. 1243; see particularly Ott and reA-frAuchiger (2018), pp. 65-67.
83  hOlmes (1897).
84  POsner (1993).
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On close examination, however, Posner’s analysis is not free from flaws. 
Posner for instance contends that the strongest argument in favor of the wealth 
maximization principle is the fact that in countries in which markets operate more 
or less freely, people not only enjoy a high standard of living, but also possess more 
political rights and more freedom and dignity. A high standard of living is primarily 
thought to result from a free market economy in these countries. Viewed in this light, 
Posner’s argument can be seen as a plea for a society based on economic freedom, 
which in turn affords individuals the liberty to operate freely (in the economic 
sphere at least). However, legal rules directed toward economic efficiency represent 
efficiency not primarily in categories of individual freedom of action or freedom 
to operate but are addressed mostly toward the collective (i.e., toward achieving 
overall social or economic efficiency).85 Such rules have the potential to reduce–not 
to enhance–an individual’s scope of action, and consequently, to make their own 
autonomous choices. Paradoxically, therefore, Posner’s pragmatism might be viewed 
as a plea against the economic analysis of law, at least to the extent that free market 
mechanisms ought to be stimulated by Kaldor–Hicks-efficient legal rules. Whether 
or not it is a stated goal of the economic analysis of law to strengthen free market 
mechanisms as such, the assumptions that this approach is based upon bear a close 
resemblance to a theory that evaluates individual behavior not based on freedom 
of choice but on particular outcomes, and thereby presumes that individual actors 
behave “correctly” only if they work toward achieving these goals.86
On the other hand, Posner contends that the welfare and prosperity in the 
countries he observes are a result of the wealth maximization principle. Posner 
thereby assumes a minimal state with no social or economic policy regulations. Critics 
of Posner’s account, however, contend that the countries that Posner contemplates–
particularly the U.S. and Western Europe–have been thriving precisely because their 
legal systems protect individual rights through equally balanced social and economic 
policies.87 These countries, they maintain, have never enforced a policy of radical 
laissez-faire liberalism as Posner seems to suggest.88
IV. CONCLUSION
The discussion of  the philosophical foundations of  the economic efficiency 
rationale illustrates that there is no compelling position based on which a Kaldor–
Hicks efficient legal system might be justified. A purely efficiency-oriented society 
would most clearly resemble the philosophical position of  utilitarianism and would 
share its deficiencies while eliminating its strengths. Attempts to justify the economic 
efficiency rationale based on consensus theory are even less convincing. Kaldor–
85  Kuenzler (2008).
86  KrOnmAn (1980).
87  stiglitz (2013).
88  KrOszner and shiller (2013). 
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Hicks efficiency is controversial because there will always be some members of  society 
that will lose in a social system that maximizes wealth. All consensus-theoretical 
justifications ultimately lead back to utilitarianism and pose new, unresolved problems.
At first sight, therefore, Posner’s pragmatic approach, under which economic 
efficiency should be pursued to accomplish other social goals, seems attractive. But 
this argument turns out to be a plea for a laissez-faire economics as a key part of free 
market capitalism. In addition, Posner’s hypothesis that wealth maximization brings 
about more political rights and more freedom and human dignity turns out to be 
flawed. The minimal state that Posner contemplates has long been abolished—even 
if its ideas are resuscitated in all parts of the world today—in an effort to mitigate 
the outgrowths of capitalism and its untenable repercussions on human dignity.89 
Posner’s arguments therefore can scarcely offer a comprehensive justification of the 
economic efficiency rationale on which liberal societies are thought to be based.
89  See wAldrOn (2012).
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